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Images of Time and Timelessness: A Musical 
Reading of Death in Venice
Marlies De Munck
This essay is based on an old, well–known question in aesthetics: how to 
represent time in its fleetingness without halting, appropriating, objectify-
ing, or transcending it? The question inspires a reading of Thomas Mann’s 
Death in Venice as the account of a transformation in which a wish to over-
come time turns into the erotic desire of being delivered to time. As such, 
the story reflects the tension between two competing views of music: music 
as an Apollonian play of time–transcending, auditory forms, and music 
as the Dionysian art in time. A phenomenological reading of Luchino 
Visconti’s adaptation of the novella complicates this plainly dualistic oppo-
sition. The essay traces how the aesthetic suspension of time is contrasted 
with, but also depends on, the spectator’s real–time experience. Similarly, 
the two classical, competing views of music stand in a complex dialectical 
relation to each other and reflect our existential relation to time.
Like the harmony of the spheres, the time that is not our time—time in 
general—is excluded from immediate sensory perception. Yet, as it is filled 
with things, episodes, and actions, we can abstractly distinguish between 
its worldly effects and time as the cause that transcends experience. Still, 
it is hard to conceive of time in itself without imaginatively turning it into 
an abstract state of timelessness, a static, eternal realm of time. To be sure, 
many great thinkers have questioned the “out–thereness” of time and have 
regarded it, rather, as a universal post rem or a priori form of intuition. 
Even within the confines of human experience time causes philosophical 
puzzlement. It dictates our whole lives, imposes its monomaniac regime of 
irreversibility on everything it touches, but eludes our grasp whenever we 
try to engage in it, in and of itself. At first sight, its intangibility may facili-
tate a common desire to bracket time or our consciousness of it. Who has 
never longed for a world in which the persons and things we love simply 
stay the way they are? On the other hand, we are also obsessed with time, as 
we love punctuality and as we delight in races against the clock. The obses-
sion with exact time can easily be exposed, however, as yet another attempt 
to control its unceasing and unforgiving movement. It is as if time plays 
with us, being both present and absent, not only in and to our experience 
but even in our thoughts. Time does not just fly—it plays hide–and–seek.
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In and Out of Time
In its play of presence and absence, the experience of time is closely re-
lated to the fear of death. To appease this fear, it is often said that death 
needs to be given a face. Following Emmanuel Levinas and Philippe Ariès, 
Rudi Visker argues that naming or representing death symbolically sepa-
rates it from life and fends it off as a heterogeneous element. The correct 
way to exorcize the dead and keep them from haunting the living consists 
neither in explaining death philosophically nor in calculating its medical 
probability. To be a successful image of death, not even resemblance is 
needed. All that is required is for us to put it boldly in its proper place—on 
the shelf—thereby isolating it from life (Visker 2007, 140–54). Similarly, 
time can be represented symbolically. Successful images of time offer a 
handle on its otherwise uncontrollable fleetingness; by bringing it under 
our explicit attention and making it graspable to the senses they enable 
us to relate to time and vicariously help us deal with life’s transience. The 
question, however, is what kind of time such images relate us to. When 
time is placed “out there,” is it not transfigured into something else—a 
timeless object—just like symbols of death are purported to do? To what 
extent, then, is it still an image of time?
Music—not the celestial, inaudible music of the spheres but our own 
earthly music—has often been considered to be the perfect medium to 
represent time. According to Arthur Schopenhauer, however, music of-
fers an escape from the threat of time by taking us out of it. It creates a 
safe realm of timelessness while we play or listen. Schopenhauer (1969) 
thought of music, on the one hand, as the purest art in and of time,1 but 
also held it capable, on the other hand, of engendering the aesthetic ex-
perience in which “the individual . . . is pure will–less, painless, timeless 
subject of knowledge” (179; emphasis mine). Other philosophers main-
tain that music does not take us out of time but rather delivers us to it: for 
them, music is an attempt to come to terms with time and to control its 
powers. Theodor Adorno (1995, 66), for instance, often pointed out that 
music structures time: 
The self–evident, that music is a temporal art, that it unfolds in time, 
means, in the dual sense, that time is not self–evident for it, that it has 
time as its problem. It must create temporal relationships among its 
constituent parts, justify their temporal relationship, synthesize them 
through time. Conversely, it itself must act upon time, not lose itself to 
it; must stem itself against the empty flood.
Music, in his view, deals with time, rather than escapes it.
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Through music we can interfere with time’s pace, slow it down or speed 
it up, stop and repeat it as much and as often as we like. Since it allows us 
to manipulate time, music seems to be able to go against its grain. It cuts 
time–slices out of the continuum of history and holds them fixed, saves 
them from the omnivorous appetite of the past. Music, in this sense, lives 
in the realm of the aesthetic “as if ”—as if time were not so unforgiving. 
This is why, according to Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (2011), we sing 
or play refrains: in doing so we create our own territory and keep our fear 
of death at bay. Their “plateau” on the refrain opens accordingly: 
A child in the dark, gripped with fear, comforts himself by singing under 
his breath. He walks and halts to his song. Lost, he takes shelter, or orients 
himself with his little song as best he can. The song is like a rough sketch 
of a calming and stabilizing, calm and stable, center in the heart of chaos. 
Perhaps the child skips as he sings, hastens or slows his pace. But the song 
itself is already a skip: it jumps from chaos to the beginnings of order in 
chaos and is in danger of breaking apart at any moment. (343)
And yet, if we conceive of music primarily as a container of time, we 
risk denying it as a phenomenon in time. Time might be held captive in 
acoustic structures but music also unfolds in time and is enfolded by it. 
We can understand Adorno’s remark in this sense: if it is music’s primal 
goal to overcome time’s merciless hold over it and to afford us a glimpse of 
what it would mean to reverse the odds, it does so primarily by structuring 
time, not by halting it. Repetition, for instance, takes place in time and yet 
it challenges the irreversibility of it. Thus, music aims at a kind of timeless-
ness—it seeks to overcome time—not by escaping or stopping it but by 
playing with it—indeed, by domesticating it.
Deleuze and Guattari (2011) push the argument for music’s time–
bound nature even further and contest music’s repeatability itself. 
Repetition makes the refrain unmusical, they say, because it renounces the 
developmental nature of music as a becoming in time. “The refrain,” the 
authors maintain, “is rather a means of preventing music, warding it off, or 
forgoing it” (331; emphasis mine).2 In the same vein, Vladimir Jankélévitch 
(2003, 20) suggests that the idea of perfect repeatability in music classi-
fies, just like the idea of musical symmetry, as a “spatial projection of the 
temporal process of becoming.” Reflecting on music’s temporal nature he 
wonders: “Thus, is repetition in music not a priori a shock, are the refrains 
and ritornellos of strophic song, or the periodic recurrences of rondo form, 
not also a shock?” (21). Influenced by Henri Bergson’s concept of durée, 
Jankélévitch takes the irreversibility and the diversifying effects of time 
seriously, the consequences of which naturally extend to the very nature 
of music. Even though we can recognize a theme or a whole piece of music 
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when played more than once, it can never be exactly the same precisely 
because it is repeated in time. Thus, Jankélévitch provides an answer to his 
earlier question: 
Independent from any memory, the pure fact of succession and the pret-
erite, in other words the naked past–ness of the past, prevents the “same” 
from remaining exactly the same; this continuous conditioning, in the 
process of Becoming, assumes the form of a continuous alteration. This 
is why the da capo is a ravishing surprise, why a theme does not give up 
all that stirs us in its meaning until it is recognized again. (24)
This answer not only implies that music, like everything else in life, 
is subjected to time’s irreversibility; it also confirms Adorno’s earlier sug-
gestion that music lives by virtue of a struggle with time—a struggle that, 
though it can never be won, proves more than fertile for the sake of music 
itself. “For if it is entirely temporal,” Jankélévitch (2003, 97) writes, “music 
is at the same time a protest against the irreversible and (thanks to remi-
niscence) a victory exacted from the irreversible, a means of resuscitating 
the same in the form of the other.” Apparently, as much as music is an art 
in and of time, it is always also on its way out. It cannot help but try to 
overcome its time–bound condition.
Vanity
A look into iconology suggests the same, deep connection: traditionally, 
music has always been linked to time and its dreaded companion, death. 
Tempus fugit and we better be aware of it. Music renders time tangible, 
makes it perceptible not just to the ear but also, through its instruments 
and scores, to the eyes. As such it has become a particularly strong pictorial 
symbol of life’s transitoriness, as is prominently shown in the vanitas still 
lives of seventeenth–century Flemish and Dutch painters.
Vanitas tableaux typically consist of objects symbolizing either the 
passing of time or death itself, such as hourglasses and clocks, musical 
instruments and scores, skulls, withered flowers, bubbles, rotten fruit, and 
many more. Each depicted object in Pieter Claesz’s famous Vanitas with 
Violin and Glass Ball, for instance, symbolizes the finiteness of worldly ac-
tivities and pleasures: the violin and bow take up a prominent place in the 
composition as the rival art of painting, yet they are muted by the painter. 
The glass is overturned, empty, and the book remains prominently closed, 
overshadowed by a skull—the accompanying quill and holder remain for-
ever still. A candle is extinguished, a solitary walnut cracked, and a watch 
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lies upside down with its mechanism exposed, as if someone had tried to 
unravel the secret of time. Reflected in a glass ball, the image of the painter 
looks frail and quasi–transparent, ready to burst like a bubble and vaporize 
in the air.3 Even though these images are non–temporal themselves, they 
do evoke the idea of passing time, of mortality and the ephemeral nature 
of human existence. They remind the viewer, in accordance with the then 
prevailing Calvinistic spirit, that it is vain to search for beauty or happiness 
in this life. Pious humbleness and serene devotion: these are the keys to the 
afterlife. “Memento mori,” vanitas paintings say: remember your own mor-
tality, do not use up time as if it were unlimited but aspire for the timeless 
world beyond—accordingly, do not waste time on the mundane, fleeting 
joys of music making.
Example 1: Pieter Claesz, Vanitas Still Life with Violin and Glass Ball, c. 1628, oil on panel, 
36 x 59 cm. Germanisches Nationalmuseum, Nuremberg.
However, didn’t music also contain that particular promesse de bonheur, 
essential to the appeal of the afterlife: the promise of eternity, a utopian es-
cape from time? Isn’t it precisely music’s tendency to conceal time or its at-
tempt to overcome it, rather than its mundane use of it, that makes it such 
an appropriate symbol of vanity, perhaps even of hubris? Indeed, the icono-
logical relation between music and time is ambiguous: does the image of 
music, in vanitas painting, symbolize the plain consumption of time or 
rather its ingenious aspiration to create its own realm of timelessness within 
time? According to Wayne Martin (2006) such ambiguity is characteristic of 
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the genre of vanitas painting. Their semiotic structure consists of different 
layers of meaning and results in so–called “dialectical polysemy.” By accu-
mulating multiple symbolic codes, one set of meanings, i.e. the connota-
tions of pleasure and accomplishment, is balanced by an opposing set of 
meanings, i.e. vanity and death, to the effect of a subtle critique that works 
both ways. “Like the Book of Ecclesiastes,” Martin writes, “the still–life tra-
dition catalogs and celebrates the very worldly pleasures and accomplish-
ments which it at the same time submits to a critique” (564).4 Apparently 
music owed its central place in vanitas painting precisely to its ambiguous 
relation to time—or, perhaps more accurately, to its treacherous aspiration 
to a “false” kind of timelessness. For the pious Calvinist, music’s vanity 
shone through either way: it either appeared as a sheer waste of time or as a 
vain challenge to time itself.
Throughout Western history, the tension between music’s transcendent 
aspirations and its worldly pleasures has elicited ambivalent reactions, not 
in the least from philosophers and church fathers, often leading to elaborate 
censorial claims. The ancient Greeks solved this ambiguity pragmatically 
by simply assigning music to two different gods. Under the reign of Apollo, 
music was perceived as a crystalline structure that seals up time and turns 
it into a stabile, intelligible order. Under the influence of Dionysus, music 
revealed a seemingly irreconcilable aspect: as a time–devouring medium it 
embodied life in its most transient, bodily form and was therefore closely 
connected to death. And yet, according to Friedrich Nietzsche (1993), the 
Dionysian art, even though it implied the dissolution of the principium in-
dividuationis, unmasked the Apollonian principle as the true antagonist of 
life. That is to say, by making the Dionysian bearable for human ears and 
eyes, Apollo was the greater deceiver because he lent a blissful aura to the 
delusive idea of a world beyond time: 
Apollo overcomes the suffering of the individual by means of the lumines-
cent glorification of the eternity of the phenomenon; beauty triumphs over 
the suffering inherent in life; pain is, in a certain sense, deluded away from 
amongst the features of nature. In Dionysiac art and its tragic symbolism, 
the same nature addresses us with its true, undisguised voice: “Be like 
me! The Primal Mother, eternally creative, eternally impelling into life, 
eternally drawing satisfaction from the ceaseless flux of phenomena!” (80; 
emphasis in the original)
Music, according to Nietzsche, does not offer an escape from time in 
the Schopenhauerian sense. Being both Dionysian and Apollonian, it in-
herits all the ambiguities that circle the experience of time in life. Still, in 
The Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche regarded music more as a Dionysian than as 
an Apollonian art. The inevitable question is therefore not whether music 
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embodies time rather than timelessness, but how it does so. How can music 
represent “the ceaseless flux of phenomena” without at once hypostatizing 
it, if only by making it repeatable, and thus isolating it from life? How can 
it retain its Dionysian nature without being ultimately neutralized by its 
Apollonian appearance?
Death in Venice
Time’s Janus–faced appearance is a prominent theme in Mann’s early no-
vella Death in Venice ([1912] 1989). The story has often been read as a moral 
tale about the Apollonian ideal being shattered by the destructive forces of 
Dionysus. According to this interpretation the main character of the story, 
the famous writer Gustav von Aschenbach, gradually falls prey to a moral 
decline during a holiday at the Venetian Lido.5 As soon as the stunning 
appearance of the young Tadzio catches his eye, Aschenbach is infatuated 
with the boy and becomes increasingly intoxicated by his own desire. His 
blatant incapacity to react properly to the situation soon amounts to an 
emotional paralysis that hinders the healthy channeling of his forbidden 
desire, and this, slowly but steadily, strangles him. Meanwhile, Venice is 
struck by a devastating cholera epidemic and turns into the mirror image of 
Aschenbach’s inner state: both are heading straight, like the title ominously 
foretells, for a fatal ending.
Put like this, the story reveals itself as a clear instance of the age–old 
conflict between the intellect and the passions and is indeed easily trans-
lated into Nietzschean vocabulary as an example of the clash between the 
Apollonian and the Dionysian principle. Inspiring Aschenbach’s pedophilic 
desires, the Dionysian is understood as an immoral force of decay, whereas 
the emblem of his professional success evokes the Apollonian realm. This, 
however, is a distorted use of Nietzsche’s terminology since he never defined 
the terms as morally good or bad, nor did he consider the Greek tragedy as a 
contest to be won either by Apollo or Dionysus. An interpretation concerned 
with the experience of time, on the other hand, can preserve the genuine 
ambiguity of the story and avoid moral one–sidedness. Thus, Aschenbach, 
who has always lived the static life of a disciplined man, rediscovers time as 
an essential part of his life. The confrontation with illness and death makes 
him acutely aware that his time is continuously ticking away, whereupon he 
feels an increasing need to give in to his passions.
As a fictional representation of the experience of time one can wonder 
whether Death in Venice is not a variant of the vanitas–genre. Could it be 
read as a literary still life, a novelistic memento mori? Is it meant to de-
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liver a moral message, a reminder that no one is immune to the workings 
of time—that time cannot be deceived with idle tricks and gimmicks? A 
short passage in the novella supports this reading as it explicitly refers to a 
typical vanitas–object: the hourglass. Near the end of the story Aschenbach 
remembers that 
long ago, in his parental home, he had watched the sand filter through an 
hourglass—he could still see, as though it stood before him, the fragile, 
pregnant little toy. Soundless and fine the rust–red streamlet ran through 
the narrow neck, and made, as it declined in the upper cavity, an exquisite 
little vortex. (Mann 1989, 61)
Just like music, the hourglass traditionally symbolizes life’s transience 
and therefore often serves as an image of death. In Mann’s Doctor Faustus 
the motif of the hourglass pops up several times, always in connection to 
the main character’s appointed death. Hourglasses not only display the 
present in the trickling sand, they also visualize the future and the past 
by keeping the two neatly separated yet simultaneously present inside the 
two glass bulbs. This makes them a remarkably strong symbol of time’s 
omnipresence. However, the passage just quoted does not refer to the ob-
ject as a straightforward symbol of time as such. Aschenbach’s recollection 
of the hourglass is far more ambiguous than the traditional, moralistic 
understanding of vanitas symbolism suggests. As he marvels at the object, 
he realizes that it does not draw attention to the passage of time but rather 
conceals it by hiding the sand’s movement inside, the escape of the fine 
streamlet being hardly visible. Only in the end does the little vortex re-
veal time’s true fleeting nature, as an insight that comes too late. It is not 
clear which aspect of time the hourglass symbolizes here: does it stand for 
time’s omnipresence or rather for its tricky concealment? Or, is it meant 
to remind of our desire for control over time? After all, the hourglass is an 
instrument designed by man, to be turned upside down, again and again, 
just as long as we want.
In The Gay Science Nietzsche (2001) introduces his famous idea of the 
eternal recurrence of the same, a passage very well known by Mann. The 
demon who first utters the idea uses the image of an hourglass to evoke a 
distorted version of the more common anxieties about time: 
[the demon] “This life as you now live it and have lived it you will have 
to live once again and innumerable times again; and there will be noth-
ing new in it, but every pain and every joy and every thought and sigh 
and everything unspeakably small or great in your life must return to 
you, all in the same succession and sequence—even this spider and this 
moonlight between the trees, and even this moment and I myself. The 
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eternal hourglass of existence is turned over again and again, and you 
with it, speck of dust!” [Nietzsche] Would you not throw yourself down 
and gnash your teeth and curse the demon who spoke thus? (194)
The dilemma is reversed, it is no longer the thought of death’s inescapabil-
ity that is frightening but the idea that time will never cease, that death will 
never come as a relief. In the hands of the demon the hourglass becomes an 
instrument of torture, it is turned against man to keep time going, always 
and forever.
On further consideration these vanitas symbols prompt more and 
more questions. What does the saying “tempus fugit” actually teach us 
about time? Is it to be handled with care or to be feared as an enemy? 
Should we try to stay out of its haunting hands, use it sparingly, or should 
we conscientiously use up every minute as if it were our last?6 These are 
precisely the questions that suffuse Aschenbach’s time in Venice. For his 
whole life, in order to attain the disembodied, panoramic view of a true 
historian, he has systematically neglected an entire range of time–bound 
pleasures, only to get paralyzed by the revenge of his severely suppressed 
emotions, having forgotten how to engage in life: 
Aschenbach had once given direct expression—though in an unobtru-
sive place—to the idea that almost everything conspicuously great is 
great in despite: has come into being in defiance of affliction and pain; 
poverty, destitution, bodily weakness, vice, passion, and a thousand other 
obstructions. And that was more than observation—it was the fruit of 
experience, it was precisely the formula of his life and fame, it was the key 
to his work. (Mann 1989, 10–11)
Only in Venice, upon the encounter with Tadzio, does he realize that 
his so–called Apollonian way of life has been a pose all along, a streak of 
vanity based on an illusory and even dangerous ideal. Moreover, the hour-
glass reminds him that his time has actually been ticking since the very 
beginning, deeply hidden inside his dry, sedentary life. Only now, when 
looking back, can he see that he has in fact always participated in time, 
albeit it without taking the slightest delight in it, simply because there is no 
life outside it. There is no way either, however, to retrieve all the time lost to 
his experience. His last, frantic efforts to turn back the clock merely result 
in embarrassing traces of hair dye and the artificial smell of cosmetics, now 
mixed with the shameless odor of disinfectant that penetrates the city.
If the story centers on the removal of the life–denying Apollonian veil, 
shouldn’t we conclude that Aschenbach’s attempts to embody his emotions 




. . . has not form two aspects? Is it not moral and immoral at once: moral 
in so far as it is the expression and result of discipline, immoral—yes, 
actually hostile to morality—in that of its very essence it is indifferent to 
good and evil, and deliberately concerned to make the moral world stoop 
beneath its proud and undivided scepter? (Mann 1989, 13) 
The moral seems to be reversed: timelessness equals death, whereas time is 
the condition of real life. Isn’t Aschenbach’s fall from the Apollonian para-
dise, therefore, a return to life rather than the victory of death—doesn’t 
he die willingly, perhaps even happily? This is hard to say, given the fact 
that after his supposed illumination in Venice Aschenbach immediately 
falls back on evenly idle ways to camouflage time with make–up and hair 
dye, the very attributes of fakery that he had so much despised before. 
Moreover, in his Lebensabriß, Mann (1930, 754) referred to Death in Venice 
as “die Tragödie einer Entwürdigung,” which hardly supports an interpreta-
tion in terms of a moral resurrection.
It is difficult to formulate a straightforward interpretation of the story, 
especially if one seeks to decipher and spell out its moral content without 
misusing Nietzsche’s terminology one way or the other. All interpretations 
seem to get entangled in the paradox that circles the experience of time: 
as a force ruling over our lives it is something we seek to escape, while 
we regret not having lived it more consciously when we risk falling out of 
it for real. Time, like timelessness, is bound up with life and death. Thus, 
regardless of how we interpret the story morally, it seems safe to conclude, 
for now, that a reading in terms of the conflict between the Apollonian and 
the Dionysian principle will be misleading as long as it is presented as a 
clean dilemma with a clear outcome. A phenomenological approach, on 
the other hand, allows for a subtler, dialectical understanding of the story 
by taking into account the sensory perception of time and not merely its 
symbolic representations.
Death in Venice—The Film7
Although the adaptation to film required considerable changes and adjust-
ments, Visconti succeeded in preserving the ambiguity of Mann’s original 
story as he keeps the protagonist wavering between life–denying and life–
affirming forces. In Visconti’s hands it is precisely the experience of time 
that becomes palpable as a crucial key to the story. The heart of the matter, 
therefore, lies in the question of whether Visconti’s adaptation can be con-
sidered successful on account of the temporality of the cinematographic 
medium. How do the music and the moving images on the screen affect 
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our understanding of the story? In my view, Visconti’s use of the filmic 
medium brings about a layer of meaning that complements and deepens 
the narrative.8
In the novella (Mann 1989) music is mentioned only a few times. 
There is a reference to the music of strolling players (57) and another one 
to flute music in an orgiastic dream (65). Each of these scenes bathes in 
an oppressive atmosphere dominated by the life–threatening power of 
Dionysus. In Visconti’s film more music is added to the story, yet it does 
not unambiguously confirm nor contradict these Dionysian connotations. 
Furthermore, since film consists of moving images, the question needs to 
be raised of how this influences our perception of Aschenbach’s pursuit 
of timeless, ideal beauty, and how it connects to the vanitas–theme that 
is normally associated with still lives. As I shall try to demonstrate, it is 
through specific audiovisual effects that Visconti’s Death in Venice captures 
the unassailable reality and irreducibility of time, both closely connected to 
the fear of running out of time, and to the longing for timelessness, i.e. the 
desire to escape from the shackles of time. Both drives are acutely present 
in Aschenbach’s long chain of hesitations and it is only when we look at 
their deep entanglement that we can truly comprehend his frustrations. In 
what follows, I analyze the film’s moving images and music from the point 
of view of the spectator, as they heighten the viewer’s sensitivity to precisely 
those elements in the story that relate to Aschenbach’s changing experience 
of time. That is to say, rather than imposing a clear interpretation, the film 
makes the spectator feel the tensions that make up the nucleus of the plot. 
It does not merely represent the double mode of experiencing time but 
presents it in a way that cannot be released from the images and the music 
itself.
The importance of the music is emphasized by Visconti’s decision to 
make Aschenbach into a composer instead of a writer. Throughout we 
hear parts and even entire movements of Gustav Mahler’s third and fifth 
symphonies, mildly suggesting that they are Aschenbach’s own creations.9 
Most prominent is the fifth symphony’s famous Adagietto, which resounds 
at least four times at key moments in the story. Furthermore, Mahler’s set-
ting of Nietzsche’s Mitternachtslied from Also sprach Zarathustra plays a 
pivotal role.10 This song is heard only once, in the middle of the film, where 
it literally underscores the hinge point of the story when Achenbach fails, 
semi–deliberately yet irrevocably, to seize on the occasion to be cured from 
his infatuation. The last lines of the verse couldn’t be more appropriate, 
not only because they illustrate Aschenbach’s failure but because the song’s 
words draw attention to the paradoxical nature of his desire in relation to 
time: “Doch alle Lust will Ewigkeit—,—Will tiefe, tiefe Ewigkeit!”
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The Adagietto introduces and concludes the film. While the opening 
credits roll it resounds for almost three full minutes before the first shot 
appears on the screen. It continues as we see the hazy panorama of the 
Venetian sea, blinking in the twilight of a glorious sunrise and providing 
the most enchanting setting for the slowly approaching boat that brings 
Aschenbach to his final destination. From this very first moment on, both 
the music and the images set the pace: this story will be slow—very slow. 
Adagietto means “slightly faster than adagio” (but still rather slow) and as 
a dynamic indicator it refers not only to the music but also to the visual 
tempo on the screen. Visconti’s images are anything but typical for a “mo-
tion picture” as they display a strong tendency to slow down. Not only the 
panoramic opening shot but nearly all the following scenes—notoriously 
those in the hotel lobby and those on the beach—evoke a particular kind 
of nostalgia: the yearning for a standstill.
The camera moves sluggishly inside static settings of practically im-
mobile persons and objects. Alternately, the images look like landscape 
paintings, still lives, and portraits in the most traditional sense of the 
genre, for instance the first shot of Tadzio, and they hardly conceal the 
artificial poses and the weariness of their models. We can almost smell the 
museum–like mustiness of the hotel lobby where the guests are waiting 
endlessly for dinner to start. Here, the atmosphere of profound boredom 
is only worsened by the out–of–tune scraping of a local string quartet, 
which fossilizes the scene to the extent that the images really appear to 
be heading back to their still ancestors, fleeing from the immense weight 
of waiting. This remarkable tendency to slow down is acutely palpable by 
contrast with the real portraits of Aschenbach’s wife and daughter. When 
he takes them out of his luggage and kisses them, these images give the 
impression, ironically, of containing more life, albeit it in the past, than 
the entire next scene in the lobby. The curious aspiration of the film’s 
moving images to escape from their own temporality by searching for 
the point where they become stills again persists throughout—a tendency 
that certainly accounts to a large extent for the often heard critique that 
the film is too long and, above all, too slow.
Not surprisingly, Mahler’s Adagietto does not help in this regard. 
The movement illustrates with great precision how music can slow down 
time—in fact, the composer added the instruction “sehr langsam” to this 
movement. The broadly spun out melody drags the chords along, changes 
them like arpeggios spread out over a long stretch of time. Passing from 
one note to the other we can only anticipate what lies within each mo-
mentary horizon of time as there is no momentum or cadence to project 
us further into the future with a sweep of élan. In this sense the Adagietto 
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can be heard as a vivisection, a close–up of the musical experience: in slow 
motion it allows us an intimate view of the music’s deepest inside while 
still at work. We experience the isolated pulse of time that usually passes 
by unnoticed. Precisely by not going fast, by not making grand gestures 
but flirting with the idea of prolonging every moment into eternity—by 
pushing every note onto the very brink of timelessness, but never be-
yond—does the music draw our attention to its vital dependence on time. 
We get to hear how every note is called into existence by the preceding 
one and only then can lead us to the following, their links utterly arbitrary 
yet forever knitted together into one particular fabric of musical time. 
While every note keeps the music in the moment, each one of them also 
seems to yearn heartbreakingly for the next, calling out for continuation 
and, as we silently assume about most music, heading towards an eventual 
resolution.11
Dialectical Plays of Time and Timelessness
In Visconti’s hands, Mahler’s Adagietto makes one wonder to what extent 
music can possibly slow down before it stops being music. Evidently, it 
cannot come to a complete standstill, lest it stop being music. But how 
long can one chord be spun out, how long can a melody survive on one 
single note? What is the minimal input we need in order to hear music?12 
The feeling of excessive slowness—yet not timelessness—is enhanced by 
the images prompting a similar question: how long can one single shot 
remain immobile before it stops being a “moving image”? How long does 
it take for a film shot to return to its cradle and become photography 
again?13
How can music span time without falling apart in meaningless bits 
and pieces? Or, how can the arch of expectation be stretched without the 
listener losing the thread? These are important questions for all music, 
not only for slow or long movements. Adorno, as we have seen, refers to 
the formal aspect of music as that which sews together all the notes and 
makes for a coherent whole, a being in time. “Zeitkunst,” he writes, 
the temporal art, is equivalent to the objectification of time. This applies 
to the individual events, or musical content, to the extent that they come 
together in a context by means of the organization of their sequence, 
rather than dissolving as they pass away; and to the temporal dimension 
itself, which aims, potentially, at its own self–transcendence, based on 
the strength of the unity of what occurs within it. 
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Music’s formal organization not only makes a composition into a whole, 
in doing so it also transcends the “real time” of its own performance. 
Some have said, therefore, that musical form necessarily also appropriates 
time—a fact that Adorno obviously didn’t fail to notice: 
If time is the medium that, as flowing, seems to resist every reification, 
nevertheless music’s temporality is the very aspect through which it actu-
ally congeals into something that survives independently—an object, a 
thing, so to speak. (Adorno 1995, 66)
Objectification through structures and forms allows the listener to grasp 
time as embodied by the music and to achieve a unified experience of it. 
In other words, by reifying time, musical form overcomes time’s otherwise 
ungraspable fleetingness but also turns it into a kind of timelessness.
In Visconti’s film the music and images make time graspable as well, 
yet, I maintain, not primarily by appealing to an all–embracing form. 
The effect is equally dialectical as the one described by Adorno but it is 
achieved by virtue of a play of presence and absence that closely resembles 
the experience of time in life. By testing the limits of the temporality of 
their medium, the music and images evoke the idea of timelessness as the 
object of their desire and fear. They embody the Midnightsong’s punch line 
in an unexpectedly literal sense: “Doch alle Lust will Ewigkeit.” Precisely by 
not arriving at a complete standstill but by approaching it ever so closely, 
the music and images, in all their slowness, evoke the idea of being out 
of time. In doing so, however, they draw attention to the thin line that 
separates them from it and thus demonstrate the impossibility—and, ulti-
mately, the undesirability—of absolute stillness. Instead, they become even 
more palpable as being radically situated within time.
This dialectical mechanism draws on a common experience of time in 
life, when by the desire to forget, escape, or reverse time we are made most 
aware of its obstinate irreversibility. Just like Aschenbach, the music and 
images can only aim at a crystalline world beyond time, asymptotically, 
without ever being able to fully reach that final point, unless they cease 
being the temporal medium they are. Thus they evoke a realm of timeless-
ness as the other side of the line that is permanently there—sometimes 
astonishingly close, but always, like Tadzio in the Mitternachtslied–scene, 
just beyond reach—only to the effect of throwing Aschenbach back into 
the real world of longing. It is this real world of longing, then, that we hear 
and see, through the aspirations to a timeless, Apollonian world beyond.
The story can be understood accordingly, as the account of the trans-
formation of Aschenbach’s purely aesthetic, distant fascination for Tadzio’s 
Apollonian beauty into an erotic desire for proximity. Urged by a strong 
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sense of death approaching, he starts to engage in the daily routines at 
the Venetian Lido. Soon he no longer wishes to contemplate the object 
of his desire as a timeless ideal but wants to engage in it, touch and feel it, 
incarnate his desire within his life. Precisely by being confronted with the 
frigidity of the Apollonian ideal—the plain fact that timelessness excludes 
life, and thus equals death—he becomes aware of his strong need to par-
ticipate in life. The more death gets a hold on Aschenbach, the more he 
becomes aware of his own time ticking away. He increasingly realizes how 
his former refuge into a timeless world of beautiful forms will not help him 
escape from death. Consequently, he feels less and less inhibited to live 
every minute as if it were the last. In this sense, the story recounts how the 
longing for an Apollonian ideal is inevitably bound up with the Dionysian 
lure of the “ceaseless flux of phenomena.”
The film conveys this complex connection by tying the spectator down 
to the here and now of the filmic experience itself. Neither the story, nor 
the excessive visual beauty or the intoxicating, opulent music, allow the 
audience to be entirely carried away into a strictly separate aesthetic realm. 
Rather, the excessive slowness elicits an almost bodily experience of real, 
un–transfigured time passing; it installs impatience in the spectator, the 
subtle frustration of eager anticipation, or at least a subliminal sensory 
awareness of the impossibility to accelerate or transcend the film’s pace, as 
it is only in the moment that the images can be seen and the music heard. 
The film, then, asks its spectators to engage in it, to pay close attention to 
its every detail, without offering a real escape route to an aesthetic realm 
where time is objectified or domesticated. Indeed, there is no transcen-
dence, no transfiguration or forgetfulness of time. It is the flow of time 
itself that we are asked to experience while the music and images linger on.
Two Musical Images of Time
Phenomenologically, the film works by virtue of effects of contiguity—it 
makes palpable the quasi–physical pull of “almost–continuity” between 
time and timelessness—instead of relying on a reifying mechanism of 
form that unifies what is and remains essentially heterogeneous. It is the 
promise and the all–too–real danger of this “almost” that allows timeless-
ness to shimmer through, rather than the detachment of the illusory “as 
if ” that creates a timeless realm as a product of the aesthetic imagination. 
This difference is important, since the “almost,” dialectically, heightens our 
attention to the insurmountable presence of the moment, whereas the “as 
if ” sooths our longing by separating us from it. In the face of death, then, 
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Aschenbach catches sight of a kind of timelessness that does not, like his 
former Apollonian world of timeless beauty, lock him out of his own life 
but instead makes him conscious of the momentous here and now of his 
experience.
The distinction resembles an opposition between two modes of tempo-
rality described by Deleuze and Guattari (2011). The first mode—Aeon—
refers to the so–called “plane of consistency” where only relations of speed 
and slowness obtain, while the second—Chronos—indicates a “plane of 
transcendence” that consists of proportional relations of structure and de-
velopment (288– 98). With regard to music, they indicate different modes 
of organizing time: “to the transcendent, organizational plane of Western 
music based on sound forms and their development, we oppose the im-
manent plane of consistency of Eastern music composed of speeds and 
slownesses, movements and rest” (298). On a deeper level, the opposition 
between Chronos and Aeon reflects two conflicting modes of conceptual-
izing time that underlie the practices of composing, performing and listen-
ing. On the phenomenological level, however, music’s transcendent and 
immanent plane are always competing, so that either the former is felt to 
dominate the latter, or the latter is perceived as undermining the former. In 
order to rehabilitate the dimension of “becoming,” i.e. the immanent plane, 
the authors seek to deflate the role of musical forms and structures in what 
they see as a typically Western conception of musical time: 
the whole becoming of Western music, all musical becoming, implies a 
minimum of sound forms and even of melodic and harmonic functions; 
speeds and slownesses are made to pass across them, and it is precisely 
these speeds and slownesses that reduce the forms and functions to a 
minimum. (298)
Whether or not the authors are phenomenologically accurate in claim-
ing that a heightened awareness of the immanent mode of consistency 
necessarily reduces the appreciation of music’s formal aspects, is open to 
debate. What matters most for the present discussion is that the mere pos-
sibility to distinguish between the two modes reveals a tension that can be 
felt in all music and that is relevant even to our understanding of non–tem-
poral art works. In his essay on Rembrandt’s portraits, for instance, Georg 
Simmel (2005) similarly distinguishes between two modes of representing 
the relation between life and death in art, thereby revealing a fundamental 
difference between the underlying conceptions of death. Given the re-
markable parallel to the two conceptions of the relation between music and 
timelessness that we have distinguished—the “as if ” versus the “almost”—it 
is worth quoting him at length: 
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Now, his way of experiencing death speaks out of Rembrandt’s concep-
tion of the human being only there, where he draws this conception up 
from the ultimate depths; not in an elegiac or emotionally emphasized 
sense, because the latter originates precisely there, where death appears 
as a violation of life from the outside, as a fate that has waited for us at 
some point on the course of our life, unavoidable as a fact, not as a neces-
sity out of the idea of life itself but as that which contradicts it. If death 
is conceived of in this way—as an extraneous power over this life—then 
it attains the atrocious, deplorable character against which one either re-
volts heroically, or toward which one lyrically subjugates oneself, or with 
which one has nothing to do inwardly. (71–72) 
Death, when conceived of in sharp opposition to life, is a stranger with 
whom we have nothing to do. This is frightful, as it seems to be utterly 
arbitrary and unrelated to who we are as a person. Death, in this sense, is 
“out there”; it is a murderer. When understood as an intrinsic part of life, 
however, death becomes more personal and less frightening. It is our own 
death as it reveals itself gradually within our lives.
According to Simmel, it is the nearness of death, its being “almost” 
present, that is palpable in Rembrandt’s portraits, and this is precisely what 
makes them so touchingly accurate. They do not “signify” death by sym-
bolically referring to it, but instead represent individual lives as embracing 
life and therefore also death: 
Rembrandt’s figures have the half–light, the muteness, the questioning 
into the darkness; exactly that which in its clearest, finally, absolutely 
dominating appearance is called death, and which, regarded superficially, 
precisely to that extent appears to contain less life. In reality, they con-
tain precisely thereby the whole life. (Simmel 2005, 74; emphasis in the 
original)
Life and death, Simmel maintains, are no strict opposites. Instead, death 
inhabits life the way time inhabits it: hidden at first, but more and more 
visible as time goes by. Death as we commonly know it is nothing more 
than that little vortex, the last stage in which it fully reveals itself, but as it 
is part of life, it is also in time. The parallel with Aschenbach’s reflection on 
the hourglass is striking. “It seems to me beyond doubt,” Simmel writes,
that death inhabits life from the onset. Indeed, death reaches macro-
scopic visibility—absolute domination, so to speak— only at the moment 
of death. But life would be different from birth on, and in each of its 




Similarly, Visconti’s film installs an almost physical awareness of the 
complex relation between the experience of time, and the longing for and 
fear of transcending it. All are present yet not strongly opposed—rather, 
they dialectically reinforce each other. It is no surprise, therefore, that even 
the moment in which Aschenbach eventually passes away is stretched out 
in time. Only when bystanders come to his aid do we see that the unavoid-
able has taken place; that the long, drawn out “almost” of his death has 
finally given way to the full presence of its “now.” Indeed, Aschenbach’s 
two dominant preoccupations—his desire to petrify time and his fear 
of succeeding all too well in that task—have reinforced each other in a 
dispute that could only be decided by that ultimate gesture of time. Not 
coincidentally, the little streamlets of hair dye trickling over the deceased 
Aschenbach’s forehead evoke strong iconic reminiscences of Christ with 
the thorn crown. Aschenbach—the former Apollonian artist—is now 
wholly exposed: the hourglass is broken and finally releases what was al-
ways hidden inside. The warm blood of a human being has replaced the 
trickling sand. In dying, he is revealed as a fully incarnated, true being in 
time.
Who wins? Apollo or Dionysus? Depending on how we approach it, 
music can show itself as a structure transcending time or rather reveal 
its radical being in time. Traditionally, western aesthetics has prioritized 
the first: it is only by creating the auditory illusion of “timeless” time that 
music attains its place among the fine arts. The according ideal of “disin-
terested” listening turns music into the object of an aesthetic experience 
and so reifies its musical time. The other conception of musical time is 
less discussed, perhaps also less appreciated as the basis for an aesthetic 
mode of perception, yet it surely is just as real in listening practices. It asks 
the listener to engage in music without objectifying its flow or hypostatiz-
ing its forms. It is only in this second mode of listening that we can truly 
experience what Jankélévitch called the “delightful shock of repetition,” as 
we recognize time as it is in us, not “out there.”
Notes
1. “I might still have much to add on the way in which music is perceived, namely in and 
through time alone, with absolute exclusion of space” (Schopenhauer 1969, 266).
2. Wittily, the authors oppose the refrain to “music”: “Music is a creative, active operation 
that consists in deterritorializing the refrain. Whereas the refrain is essentially territorial, 
territorializing, or reterritorializing, music makes it a deterritorialized content for a deter-
ritorializing form of expression. Pardon that sentence: what musicians do should be musi-
cal, it should be written in music” (Deleuze and Guattari 2011, 331).
3. Pieter Claesz, Vanitas Still Life with Violin and Glass Ball, c. 1628, oil on panel, 36 x 59 
cm. Germanisches Nationalmuseum, Nuremberg.
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4. Vanitas painting derived its name from the opening sentence of the Book of Ecclesiastes: 
“Vanitas vanitatum et omnia vanitas.”
5. For example: “Underlying this complicated process which, in Mann’s phrase describing 
Death in Venice, ‘turned the intoxicate song into a moral fable,’ there is the dualism of a book 
which deeply influenced Mann’s whole way of looking at life and art, Nietzsche’s The Birth of 
Tragedy . . . In the orgiastic dream that destroys the last shreds of Aschenbach’s self–esteem 
Apollo is routed by Dionysus, Aschenbach cannot preserve ‘his own god’ against the onslaught 
of barbaric lust and the ‘stranger god’ becomes ‘his own’” (Becket 1973, 579).
6. Similarly, Wayne Martin (2006, 5) asks: “What lesson does one take from the insistent re-
minder of the vanity of worldly pleasure and accomplishment? What ethics is prescribed by 
a skull? Here we may be tempted to close the semiotic structure by presupposing a Christian 
moral: Lay up your stores in heaven; live not for pleasure but for final judgment; pursue the 
good rather than delight . . . however, the paintings sometimes resist or at least question such 
hopeful closure.”
7. Luchino Visconti, Death in Venice, 1971.
8. Many reviewers and theorists did not find Visconti’s adaptation successful at all. See, for in-
stance, Hutchison 1974, 36: “The film does not provide, with regard to aesthetics, the subtlety, 
the depth of analysis that the novella Death in Venice can accommodate.” Or Vaget 1980, 171: 
“Thus the film has reduced and considerably simplified the complexity of Mann’s case against 
Aschenbach.”
9. Visconti’s motives for turning Aschenbach into a composer ranged from personal prefer-
ences over biographical and interpretive considerations to purely filmic concerns. He meticu-
lously modeled his protagonist after the image of Gustav Mahler, just like Thomas Mann had 
paid tribute to the recently deceased composer by adorning Aschenbach with Mahler’s first 
name and fine physiognomy. As many have noticed, this particular adaptation is not entirely 
unproblematic from a dramatic point of view. How could the composer of such dazzling, sen-
sual music ever be so fatally incapacitated when confronted with his own emotions? In fact, 
the music seems to take over the task of embodying Aschenbach’s emotions every time he fails 
to do so himself.
10. The Mitternachtslied is part of the fourth movement of Mahler’s third symphony, indicated 
as “sehr langsam—Misterioso.”
11. This description is closely connected to Husserl’s (1991, 5–53) analysis of the perception 
of melody in terms of protention and retention. Our present focus, however, is not on how we 
come to hear a series of notes as a melody but on the experience of music as an embodiment 
of time. In the philosophy of music, the borderline between phenomenological descriptions 
of the musical experience and metaphysical claims about the nature of music has oftentimes 
been blurred. The danger to slip from one into the other has lurked especially in discussions 
concerning the perceived movement in and of music. See, for instance, Victor Zuckerkandl’s 
(1973, 94) ambiguous description of the “motion of tones”: “We have understood the dynamic 
qualities of tone as the particular kind of unfulfillment peculiar to each tone, its desire for com-
pletion. No musical tone is sufficient unto itself; and as each musical tone points beyond itself, 
reaches, as it were, a hand to the next, so we too, as these hands reach out, listen tensely and 
expectantly for each next tone. To be auditively in the tone now sounding means, then, always 
being ahead of it too, on the way to the next tone. Inasmuch as we thus continually participate 
in the transition from tone to tone, we hear each interval as a step, as motion” (emphasis in 
original). It is important to keep in mind that the present account does not intend to make any 
metaphysical or ontological claims about the nature of music itself, but always and only refers 
to the products of different modes of perception, as shaped by particular concepts of time.
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12. Evidently, Mahler’s Adagietto is not particularly experimental or groundbreaking in this 
regard. It is only within the context of the present discussion about time and in relation to 
Visconti’s use of the music that it becomes paradigmatic for such a line of thought. In fact, 
many twentieth–century composers, for instance John Cage, to name but the most obvious 
example, have been much more explicit and radical in testing music’s dependence on time, 
whereas this was surely not on Mahler’s mind when he wrote his fifth symphony.
13. A similar remark ought to be made here: most probably, Visconti was not intentionally 
experimenting in this sense, whereas many contemporary video artists, for instance Bill 
Viola, actually do test the medium with this particular question in mind. Visconti’s Death in 
Venice becomes interesting in this regard mainly because of the particular story that it tells 
and the central role of time in it. It is noteworthy, though, that Visconti was working on an 
adaptation of Proust’s À la recherche du temps perdu right before he started shooting Death 
in Venice. Unfortunately, this project was canceled before the actual filming ever took place.
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